It shall be the policy of this nation …
Reading over the text of JFK’s 22 October address during the Cuban missile crisis, I noted a curious linguistic phenomenon. Of the seven points towards the end of the speech—JFK’s call to action—only one lacks any agent. Arguably, it’s the most serious of the constellation.
Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.
This point makes a statement of fact. It does not indicate an action undertaken by “I” (Kennedy directly) or “we” (the Nation as a whole, presumably). The remaining points in the speech often utilize the passive voice, but they always introduce either Kennedy or the Nation / government as the agent. (Interestingly enough, the most “passive” of the remaining points is the first, which announces the blockade and is entirely passive, without a subject, in its first sentence. It is the second-most serious point of escalation. As JFK gets closer to the brink, he uses agentless language more frequently …)
On one level, this is appropriate. Using agentless language can—somewhat paradoxically—display conviction and a sense of irrevocability. It is part of the state of affairs, a non-negotiable part of the context of the crisis, not a human action.
But by the same token, it further polarizes the crisis. It forces the Soviets to choose between A and B, since issues of fact are less negotiable.
Reading this also left me with a curious question about the current administration. If we make no distinction between the terrorists and the states that habor them, to use the president’s words, then what are we to make of states, like Pakistan, that proliferate nuclear technology? If Iran gets the bomb, do we blame Pakistan in part for this state of affairs, threatening to retaliate against them if Iran uses the technology in unwelcome ways? From the perspective of this calculus of deterrence, what’s the limit between providing technology or raw materials and providing a finished weapon?